- “Hermeneutical Injustice,” Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, forthcoming.
- “Social Ontology,” (with Katherine Ritchie), Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, forthcoming.
- “Social Metaphysics,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018.
- “The Metaphysics of Social Kinds.” Philosophy Compass, 2016: 841-850.
- “Two Kinds of Unknowing.” Hypatia, 2011: 294-307.
- “Reorienting Deliberation: Identity Politics in Multicultural Societies,” Studies in Social Justice, 2011: 7-23.
- Review of Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories. Hypatia Reviews Online, forthcoming.
- Review of Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. Hypatia Reviews Online, 2013.
Work in Progress
Rejecting the "Implicit Consensus": A Reply to Jenkins, revise and resubmit at Thought [here]
Exclusionary Semantic Arguments and the Meaning of "Woman" [here]
Social Kinds are Essentially Mind-Dependent [here]
Against Social Kind Anti-Realism [here]
Social Ontology Naturalized
My book project, Social Ontology Naturalized, aims to undermine the intuitive contrast between society and nature. I develop and argue for a radical view: many social kinds are natural kinds like those studied in the natural sciences. Moreover, social kinds, like many paradigmatically natural kinds, have real as opposed to merely nominal essences. These results lay the groundwork for a unified and systematic view of social kinds different from those on offer in the social ontology literature. In addition to offering a general account of the metaphysics of social kinds, I also address several issues that are of particular concern to feminist philosophers. In particular, I defend a novel view of gender according to which genders are historical categories with political origins. I also defend an externalist account of social kind terms and concepts that helps to undermine transexclusionary arguments. Finally, I show how my externalist account of social kind terms and concepts reveals new sources of epistemic injustice.